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1 Introduction 
 
The international diffusion of technologies for mitigating climate change is at the core of 
current discussions surrounding the post-Kyoto agreement. Technology development and diffusion are 
considered strategic objectives in the 2007 Bali Road Map. North-to-south technology transfer is of 
particular interest since technologies have been developed mostly in industrialized countries and that 
technologies are urgently required to mitigate GHG emissions in fast-growing emerging economies. A 
recent study looking at patents filed in thirteen climate change mitigation technologies shows that 
two-thirds of the inventions patented worldwide between 1998 and 2005 have been developed in only 
three countries: Japan, the USA, and Germany (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2009). 
However, enhancing technology transfer involves considerable policy and economic 
challenges because developing countries are reluctant to bear the financial costs of catching up alone, 
while firms in industrialized countries refuse to give away strategic intellectual assets. This has led to 
an intense debate on policies that affect technology diffusion, with a particular focus on the role of 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) that developing countries view as barriers to technology diffusion. 
By contrast, industrialized countries advocate that IPRs provide innovators with incentives to 
disseminate their inventions through market channels, such as foreign direct investment and the 
international trade of equipment goods. In their view, every developing country could actually 
promote transfers by developing its capability to absorb new technologies. 
This paper examines these issues by identifying the factors that promote or hinder the 
international diffusion of climate-friendly technologies. We focus the analysis on the most relevant 
questions in current policy discussions. First, is the capacity of countries to absorb foreign 
technologies important? If the answer is in the affirmative, this implies that capacity building is a 
powerful lever to technology transfer. Do strict IPRs induce more transfers? Do barriers to trade or to 
foreign direct investment significantly reduce the import of technologies?  
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We address these questions using a data set of climate-related patents filed in 66 countries 
from 1990 to 2003. The data come from the World Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT). We focus 
the analysis on twelve technologies: six renewable energy technologies (wind, solar, geothermal, 
ocean energy, biomass, and hydropower), waste-to-energy, methane destruction, energy conservation 
in buildings, climate-friendly cement, motor vehicle fuel injection, and energy-efficient lighting. 
Although not all climate-friendly technologies are covered—they represent around 33% of all GHG 
abatement opportunities up to 2030, excluding forestry (McKinsey and Vattenfall, 2007)—they 
concern very diverse sectors such as electricity and heat production, the manufacturing industry, and 
the residential sector. 
The literature dealing with the international diffusion of environment-related technology is 
limited but is growing rapidlyi. Unlike the present work, this literature is mostly descriptive. Lanjouw 
and Mody (1996) presented the first patent-based empirical evidence for the international diffusion of 
environmentally responsive technology. Based on data from Japan, Germany, the USA, and fourteen 
developing countries, the paper identifies the leaders in environmental patenting and finds that 
significant transfers occur to developing countries. Focusing on chlorine-free technology in the pulp 
and paper industry, Popp et al. (2007) provide evidence that environmental regulation may promote 
international technology transfer. They observe for instance an increase in the number of patents filed 
by US inventors in Finland and Sweden after passage of tighter regulations in these countries. Several 
case studies discuss whether stricter patent protection promotes or hinders the transfer of climate-
related technology to developing countries (see, for example, Barton, 2007; Ockwell et al., 2008). 
Finally, we recently used PATSTAT data to describe the geography of innovation and international 
technology diffusion (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2009).  
Our work is one of the first econometric studies in this area. Another very recent work is by 
Dekker et al. (2009) who study how sulfur protocols trigger invention and diffusion of technologies 
for reducing SO2 emissions. A paper by Hascic and Johnstone (2009) is also related to our work. 
They use the same data to study the impact of the Kyoto protocol. Our focus is different since we deal 
with a broader set of policy variables (including trade barriers, FDI control, etc.). Moreover, we 
develop a theoretical model to cope with simultaneity problems neglected in the other papers. 
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As a measure of diffusion, our approach is similar to that of Lanjouw and Mody (1996), Eaton 
and Kortum (1999), or Hascic and Johnstone (2009). We count the number of patent applications in 
recipient countries for technologies invented abroad. Because patent data include the inventor’s 
country of residence, we know precisely the geography of technology flows and we can run 
regressions to understand what drives cross-border technology exchanges. This indicator is a proxy of 
technology transfer because holding a patent in a country gives the holder the exclusive right in that 
country to exploit the technology commercially. This does not necessarily mean that the inventor will 
actually use the technology there. Yet, as patenting is both costly and risky, it implies that the inventor 
definitely plans to do so. 
This approach appears similar to the method based on patent citation analysis used in many 
studies seeking to measure the extent of international knowledge flows (see Jaffe et al., 1993; Peri, 
2005). But there is an important difference. Inventors obviously patent abroad to reap private benefits. 
Therefore, while citations made by inventors to previous patents are an indicator of knowledge 
spillovers, our indicator is a proxy for market-driven knowledge flows.  
The study is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the use of patents as indicators of 
technology transfer. The data set is presented in Section 3 along with data issues. In Section 4 we 
develop a theoretical model that describes the diffusion of inventions between countries. The model is 
estimated in Section 5. A final section summarizes the main results. 
 
2 Patents as indicators of technology transfer 
In the empirical literature, scholars have proposed a number of solutions for the measurement 
of international technology transfers. Because major transmission channels of knowledge across 
countries include international trade and foreign direct investments (FDI), many studies use the import 
flows of intermediate goods or FDI as a proxy variable for international transfer (for example, Coe 
and Helpman, 1995; Lichtenberg and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2001). Data on trade and FDI 
are easily available from a large number of countries, thereby allowing a very broad geographical 
coverage. However, such data are highly aggregated, which prevents their use in measuring the flows 
 6 
of climate-friendly technologies. More generally, that data are only indirect vehicles of knowledge 
transfer. 
This is why more recent papers tend to rely on patent data.ii Patent data focus on outputs of 
the inventive process (Griliches, 1990). They provide a wealth of information on the nature of the 
invention and the applicant. Most important, they can be disaggregated to specific technological areas. 
Finally, they indicate not only the countries where inventions are made, but also where these new 
technologies are used. These features make our study of climate change mitigation technologies 
possible. Of course, patent data also present drawbacks, which will be discussed below. 
To accurately explain how we use patent data in this paper, we must briefly recall how the 
patent system works. Consider a simplified innovative process. In the first stage, an inventor from 
country i develops a new technology. He then decides to patent the new technology in certain 
countries. A patent in country j grants him the exclusive right to commercially exploit the innovation 
in that country. Accordingly, the inventor patents his invention in country j if he plans to use it there. 
The set of patents protecting the same invention in several countries is called a patent family. 
In this paper we use the number of patents invented in country i and filed in country j as an 
indicator of the number of innovations transferred from country i to country j. As mentioned in the 
introduction, this indicator has already been used in previous work (see, for instance, Lanjouw and 
Mody, 1996; Eaton and Kortum, 1999). It differs, however, from those indicators that are based on 
backward patent citation and are used in the literature measuring knowledge spillovers (see Jaffe et al., 
1993).iii 
Our approach is obviously imperfect. The first limitation is that for protecting innovations, 
patents are only one of several means, along with lead time, industrial secrecy, or purposefully 
complex specifications (Cohen et al., 2000; Frietsch and Schmoch, 2006). In fact, inventors may 
prefer secrecy to avoid the public disclosure of the invention imposed by patent law, or to save the 
significant fees attached to patent filing. However, there are very few examples of economically 
significant inventions that have not been patented (Dernis and Guellec, 2001), although the propensity 
to patent differs between sectors, depending on the nature of the technology (Cohen et al., 2000) and 
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the risk of imitation in a country. These factors behind the propensity to patent have a significant 
effect on our data, because patenting is more likely in countries that have strong technological 
capabilities and that strictly enforce intellectual property rights. However, we will see that the 
econometric models developed below partly control for this problem. 
More generally, certain forms of knowledge are not patentable. Know-how or learning-by-
doing, for example, cannot be easily codified, particularly because these are skills incorporated in 
individuals. The nature of such knowledge limits the accuracy of our data. Nevertheless, research 
shows that flows of patented knowledge and of tacit knowledge are positively correlated (Cohen et al., 
2000; Arora et al., 2008). 
A further limitation is that a patent grants the exclusive right to use the technology only in a 
given country; it does not mean that the patent owner will actually do so. This could significantly bias 
our results if applying for protection did not cost anything, so that inventors might patent widely and 
indiscriminately. But this is not the case in practice. Dechezleprêtre et al. (2009) show that the average 
invention is patented in two countries.iv Patenting is costly, in both the preparation of the application 
and the administration associated with the approval procedure (see Helfgott, 1993; and Berger, 2005, 
for EPO applications). In addition, possessing a patent in a country is not always in the inventor’s 
interest if that country’s enforcement is weak, since the publication of the patent in the local language 
can increase vulnerability to imitation (see Eaton and Kortum, 1996 and 1999). Therefore, inventors 
are unlikely to apply for patent protection in a country unless they are relatively certain of the 
potential market for the technology covered. Finally, because patenting protects an invention only in 
the country where the patent is filed, inventors are less likely to engage in strategic behavior to protect 
their inventions abroad and prevent the use of their technology in the production of goods imported by 
foreign competitors in their domestic markets. 
In addition to the above limitations, the value of individual patents is heterogeneous and its 
distribution is skewed: Since many patents have very little value, the number of patents does not 
perfectly reflect the value of innovations. This problem is probably less acute in this paper than in 
other works, as we focus on international diffusion. Exported technologies are of the highest value and 
make up only about a quarter of all inventions (Lanjouw et al., 1998). 
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3 Data description 
Over the past several years, the European Patent Office (EPO), along with the OECD’s 
Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry, have developed a worldwide patent database—the 
EPO/OECD World Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT). PATSTAT is unique in that it covers 
more than 80 patent offices and contains over 70 million patent documents. PATSTAT data have not 
been exploited much until now because they became available only recently. Our study is the first to 
use PATSTAT data to explain the diffusion of climate change mitigation technologies. 
We extracted all the patents filed from 1990 to 2003 in 12 climate-mitigation fields: six 
renewable energy technologies (wind, solar, geothermal, ocean energy, biomass, and hydropower), 
waste use and recovery, methane destruction, climate-friendly cement, energy conservation in 
buildings, motor vehicle fuel injection, and energy-efficient lighting. The precise description of the 
fields covered by the study can be found in Table 1. This represents 186,660 patent applications filed 
in 76 countries.v On average, climate-related patents included in our data set represent 1% of the total 
annual number of patents filed worldwide. Since our interest is on technology diffusion, we only 
consider inventions that are patented in several countries, leaving us with 110,170 patents. 
 
Table 1. Description of the technology fields covered  
Technology 
field Description of aspects covered 
Biomass Solid fuels based on materials of non-mineral origin (i.e. animal or plant); engines operating on such fuels (e.g. wood). 
Buildings Elements or materials used for heat insulation; double-glazed windows; energy recovery systems in air conditioning or ventilation. 
Cement Natural pozzuolana cements; cements containing slag; iron ore cements; cements from oil shales, residues or waste; calcium sulfate cements. 
Fuel injection Motor fuel-injection apparatus (allowing reduced fuel consumption) 
Geothermal Use of geothermal heat; devices for producing mechanical power from geothermal energy. 
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Hydro Hydro power stations; hydraulic turbines; submerged units incorporating electric generators; devices for controlling hydraulic turbines. 
Lighting Compact Fluorescent Lamps; Electroluminescent light sources (LED) 
Methane 
Equipment for anaerobic treatment of sludge; biological treatment of waste 
water or sewage; anaerobic digestion processes; apparatus aiming at 
collecting fermentation gases. 
Ocean Tide or wave power plants; mechanisms using ocean thermal energy conversion; water wheels. 
Solar 
Solar photovoltaic (conversion of light radiation into electrical energy), 
incl. solar panels; concentrating solar power (solar heat collectors having 
lenses or reflectors as concentrating elements); solar heat (use of solar heat 
for heating & cooling). 
Waste 
Solid fuels based on waste; recovery of heat from waste incineration; 
production of energy from waste or waste gasses; recovery of waste heat 
from exhaust gases. 
Wind Wind motors; devices aimed at controlling such motors. 
 
Patent applications related to climate change are identified using the International Patent 
Classification (IPC) codes, developed at the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).vi We 
identify the IPC classes corresponding to the climate mitigation technologies in two alternative ways. 
First, we search the descriptions of the classes online to find those that are appropriate.vii Second, 
using the online international patent database maintained by the European Patent Office,viii we search 
patent titles and abstracts for relevant keywords. The IPC classes corresponding to the patents that 
come up are included, provided their description confirms their relevancy.  
When building the data sets, two possible types of error may arise: irrelevant patents may be 
included or relevant ones left out. The first error happens if an IPC class includes patents that bear no 
relation to climate mitigation. To avoid this problem, we carefully examine a sample of patent titles 
for every IPC class considered for inclusion, and exclude those classes that consist of patents 
unrelated to climate change mitigation. Key technologies involved with carbon reduction potential, 
therefore, are outside the scope of this study, which means that electric vehicles, energy efficient 
technologies in industry, or clean coal technologies are not part of our study. 
The second error—relevant inventions are left out—is less problematic. We can reasonably 
assume that all innovations in a given field behave in a similar way and hence our data sets can be 
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seen at worst as good representations of innovative activity in the field considered. Overall innovative 
activity may be underestimated, however, and may thus be less reliable than trends. 
The definitions of the IPC codes used to build the data sets can be found in Annex 1. Further details 
on data construction can be found in Dechezleprêtre et al. (2009). In addition to climate-friendly 
patents, other data are also used, in particular in order to describe the demand for technology. These 
data are described in section 5.  
 
4 Theoretical framework 
The ultimate goal of our study is to explain Nijt, which denotes the number of inventions 
invented in country i and transferred in another country j (i ≠ j) in year t. The problem is that 
substitutability or complementarity between technologies in the recipient country j imply that Nijt is 
influenced by inventions provided by local inventors, Njjt, and by inventions imported from other 
foreign countries Nkjt (k ≠ i, j). As a result, the Nijt, Njjt and Nkjt are jointly determined. In this section, 
we develop a simple theoretical model that captures this simultaneity problem, and use it to set up a 
strategy for fixing the problem in empirical estimations. 
Our approach differs from most empirical studies on trade flows and knowledge spillovers 
which usually build on gravity-like models. In our view, the micro-foundations of their approach are 
too weak to address our simultaneity problem. This is probably not a serious limitation when dealing 
with the spillover type of knowledge flows: The mechanisms through which diffusion occurs—e.g., 
labour mobility—are not driven by the market for technologies, and inventors who own the 
technologies do not play an active role, as they derive no profits from diffusion. But using a gravity 
model is more problematic in our case because we seek to explain the interdependence between 
intentional technology transfer through the market. 
We capture the interdependence between the Nijt, Njjt and Nkjt with a simple model of diffusion 
of patented technology between M countries. The decision to transfer patented technologies to another 
country is made by the patent owners in the country of origin. We assume that an individual transfer 
decision is made for each patent, towards each recipient country. More specifically, we posit that a 
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patent owner in country i will decide to transfer her technology to country j if her incremental profit is 
positive. Formally, if 
               
 
In this condition, the incremental profit depends on the incremental surplus  derived by the 
users of the technology located in country j times a variable  which reflects the patent 
owner’s capability of appropriating this surplus, such as the risk of imitation by local competitors 
given country j’s intellectual property regime, or tariffs (when the technology is embodied in an 
intermediate good). Fijt  is the fixed cost of transferring the patented technology in country j. This 
variable captures the upfront cost of filing a patent or setting up a subsidiary or distribution channel in 
country j.  
At time t, we assume that all the technology transfers from country i to country j generate an 
aggregate surplus  
 
where  , 
 
In this expression, an increase in the count of transfers from i to j induces a positive but marginally 
decreasing surplus. This surplus also depends on the quantity  of foreign and domestic ( ) 
technology patented in country j. We have no prior on the nature of this effect, which may be negative 
if technologies are substitutes ( ) or positive if they are complements ( ). Finally  is a 
vector of control variables in country j.  
This assumption about the aggregate surplus implies that 
€ 
Sijt = sijtNijt∫ where the incremental surplus 
associated with one transfer,  is a function of all technology flows as captured by 
. Taking  as given, patent owners in country i will thus transfer their technology until condition (1) 
is saturated. The technology flow Nijt  we seek to explain is thus implicitly defined by: 
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This condition makes it possible to merge the cost factors into a single parameter  for each couple 
of countries (i, j). Solving the M-1 FOC for recipient country j=1,M then yields:  
Proposition Assuming that , the number of technologies invented in country i 
and subsequently transferred in country j at time t is given by: 
  (2) 
 
The reduced-form equation (2) solves our simultaneity problem and will thus serve as a basis for our 
econometric equation. It gives an expression of the flow of inventions between country i and country j 
as a function of the exogenous variables. In particular, the LHS does not include the endogenous 
variables Nkjt that are simultaneously determined with Nijt through competition on the technology 
market. In fact, the potential for substitution or complementarity between technologies is captured by 
the variable ΠCkjt which reflects the cost of implementing technologies from other foreign countries 
than country j  or the cost of using domestic technologies. If , technologies of different origins 
are substitutable and the higher the cost of implementing in countries k≠i technologies developed in 
country j, the greater the number of technologies imported from country i to country j (since C>0). 
Conversely, if , the technologies are complementary and a higher 
implementation cost of the other technologies induces less transfers from country i to country j (C<0).  
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 Before moving to the econometric estimations, let us specify the vector of control variables as 
a function of two variables:  (with ). Kjt is the stock of knowledge accumulated 
in the recipient country. This captures the usual view in the literature on technology diffusion that 
accumulated knowledge increases the ability to exploit new technologies. Djt is a variable capturing 
factors that affect the demand for technology in the recipient country. 
After substituting  for  in (2), the log-linear form of (2) can be written as follows: 
             (3) 
where lower case letters denote the logs of the initial variables. We will use this equation a basis for 
our econometric estimations1. 
 
5 Empirical issues 
We have constructed a panel data set for each of the 12 technology fields described in Section 3. 
This is a strong point of our study: Estimating the model on each field allows us to control for 
technology-specific factors. The panels extend over 14 years, from 1990 to 2003. The final samples 
include between 2,176 and 3,181 country pairs over that period. 
5.1 Estimation equations 
 
A practical problem in estimating equation (2) is that we do not observe the number of 
inventions transferred but rather the patent flow between country i and country j. There are differences 
between these variables for the two reasons mentioned earlier. First, the number of patents that are 
granted for a given innovation varies significantly across countries. A common illustration is Japan, 
where the “amount” of technology covered by a patent—referred to by IPR experts as the patent 
                                                
1 Note that, unlike gravity-like models, our theoretical approach leads to exclude variables that feature 
specifically the country of origin of the transfers. In particular equation (3) does not include the 
number 
€ 
N it  of patented technologies available for exports in country i. To check the robustness of our 
empirical results to this specification choice, we have run separate regressions by adding the log of 
€ 
N it  in our set of explanatory variables (the estimation results are available on request). This does not 
affect our empirical results. 
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breadth—is said to be particularly low. For example, the same wind turbine covered by one patent in 
Germany may require three patents in Japan. Second, patenting is not the only way to protect 
innovation, and the propensity to patent varies across sectors and countries. 
To tackle these problems, we follow Peri (2005) and Branstetter (2001) by assuming that the 
patent flow Pijt is such that: 
  (4) 
In this expression, Φj is an observed fixed factor which measures patent breadth in country j. 
We will explain later how this variable is constructed. In contrast, is an unobserved random term 
reflecting the propensity to patent inventions in country j at time t. 
We then take the log-linear form of (4), substitute (3) for , and add time dummies to 
control for potential endogeneity due to transitory shocks. This leads to the model we will estimate: 
             (5) 
where, again, lower case letters denote the logs of the initial variables. We allow the error 
term in (5) to contain γjt, the random term capturing the unobserved propensity to patent, a country-
pair specific component and random time-varying effects such that 
  (6) 
 
 where the latter term is assumed to be a normal iid. disturbance. 
5.2 Variable description 
 
PATSTAT only yields information on Pijt. We do not have readily available data on absorptive 
capacities kjt, the implementation costs cijt with i,j = 1,..M, the demand variable djt, and the patent-
breadth variable φj= ln Φj. For these variables, we will use a linear combination of different proxies, 
which we now describe in turn.  
The recipient country’s absorptive capability : 
We seek to understand whether transferring a technology requires generic skills and/or 
technology-specific knowledge. This leads us to use two different proxy variables to describe local 
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technological knowledge. The first variable is Sjt-1, the discounted stock of previously filed patents in 
the technology at date t–1 by local inventors in the recipient country j. This is an indicator of the local 
absorptive capabilities that are specific to each technology. Following Peri (2005), the patent stock is 
calculated using the perpetual inventory method. We initialize patent stocks for the year 1978 and use 
the recursive formula 
 
where Pjjt is the number of patented technologies invented by domestic inventors in year t. The value 
chosen for δ, the depreciation of R&D capital, is 10%, a value commonly used in most of the literature 
(see Keller, 2002).ix Note that using Sjt-1—i.e., lagging the variable by one year to predict transfers in 
year t given the stocks in year t-1—eliminates the potential problem of endogeneity. 
The second proxy variable is edujt, the tertiary gross enrollment ratio, which is the average 
percentage of the population of official school age for tertiary education actually enrolled in this level 
over the previous 10 years.  
The implementation cost  
Note that we describe here not only the cost cijt, but also ckjt, with k ≠ i. We use five variables to 
measure the cost of adopting a patented invention. A country-specific index built by Park and Lippoldt 
(2008), iprjt, measures the strictness of intellectual property rights in the recipient country. A lax 
patent system can deter the import of foreign technologies, because of the fear of counterfeiting (see, 
for example, Maskus, 2000; Smith, 2001; and Barton, 2007). This issue is hotly debated in the 
political arena. 
Note that iprjt likely affects the propensity to patent in country j, which may make our results more 
difficult to interpret. McCalman (2001) shows that the value of patent rights significantly increased in 
those countries that had signed the TRIPS agreement in 1994. That increase in value may have two 
consequences. First, the increase in the payoff associated with patenting may result in more transfers 
of patented technologies, which is what we want to measure. However, it may also result in additional 
patent applications for technologies that would have been transferred anyway through trade or FDI. 
Consequently, we can overestimate the effect of iprjt on technology transfer. 
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The variables tariffjt and trade_blocijt capture the existence of potential barriers to international 
trade. More precisely, tariffjt is the recipient country’s mean of tariff rates based on data from the 
World Trade Organization and the World Bank. Meanwhile, trade_blocijt is a dummy variable 
indicating whether the countries are part of the same trade bloc. Arguably, restrictions to trade may 
hinder the transfer of technologies embodied in capital equipment goods. 
As is usual in the trade literature, we also include the log of the geographic distancex between 
country i and country j, called distanceij. This distance variable is generally viewed as a proxy for 
transportation costs. Empirical evidence shows that knowledge flows are affected by distance (Peri, 
2005), though less than trade flows.xi  
Foreign direct investments are another well-known channel of technology diffusion. Accordingly, 
we include the variable fdi_controljt, which is an index of international capital market control based on 
data from the World Economic Forum and the International Monetary Fund.xii 
Finally, one can reasonably assume that filing a patent in a country where the same language is 
spoken reduces transaction costs. Indeed, the applicant saves translation costs, and national legal 
systems are likely to be closer. Therefore, languageij is a dummy variable which equals 1 if both 
countries share a common official language and 0 otherwise. 
The demand for climate change technologies 
€ 
d jt   
Given the scope of our country dataset, it has not been possible to collect consistent policy 
variables for each country. Using a simple variable such as the ratification of the Kyoto protocol 
would be unsatisfactory as well for, in absence of complementary information on the country policies, 
the results would be difficult to interpret. To control for demand, we thus use two general variables 
that are common to all technologies: gdp_per_capitajt, and popjt,xiii. The first one describes country j’s 
per capita GDP in PPP USD, the second one is the log of its population. We also use technology-
specific demand variables, which are listed in Table 2.  
 
Table 2. Description of demand variables, by technology 
Technology field Variable Definition and sources 
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Biomass elec_biomassjt Energy production from biomass (Mtoe) 
Buildings 
urbanjt 
constructionjt 
Winter_tempj 
Urban population (million inhabitants) 
Construction sector (bn USD) 
Average winter temperature 1991-2000 (°C) 
Cement constructionjt Construction sector (bn USD) 
Fuel injection carsjt gas_pricejt 
# of passenger cars per 1,000 people 
Gasoline price (USD per liter) 
Geothermal elec_renewjt Production of renewable energy (Mtoe) 
Hydro elec_hydrojt Production of hydro electricity (Mtoe) 
Lighting urbanjt  constructionjt 
Urban population (million inhabitants) 
Construction sector (bn USD) 
Methane agriculturejt Agriculture sector (bn USD) 
Ocean elec_renewjt coast_lengthj 
Production of renewable energy (Mtoe) 
Coast length (1,000 km) 
Solar 
elec_renewjt 
cloud_coverj 
latitudej 
Production of renewable energy (Mtoe) 
Average cloud cover (%) 
Latitude of main city (absolute value) 
Waste elec_renewjt Production of renewable energy (Mtoe) 
Wind elec_renewjt coast_lengthj 
Production of renewable energy (Mtoe) 
Coast length (1,000 km) 
 
Sources: International Energy Agency, World Bank 2008, Tyndall Center, World  
resources Institute, CEPII, United Nations Statistics Division 
 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for independent variables 
Variable Observations Mean Std deviation 
Pij, Depending on the technology 
Sjt-1 Depending on the technology 
edujt  59150 33.64 20.35 
iprjt 60060 3.261 0.998 
tariffjt  55315 12.17 11.29 
trade_blocjt  60060 0.064 0.245 
fdi_controljt  58240 4.311 2.907 
distanceijt 60060 8.586 0.945 
languageijt  60060 0.094 0.292 
 60060 4.16 6.05 
 60060 558.1 29.55 
 60060 6.121 5.814 
popjt 60060 9.907 1.576 
Elec_renewit  58240 14.855 36.065 
Elec_biomassit 58240 10983 32185 
Elec_hydroit 58240 2988.5 5931.8 
urbanjt  59150 34.766 64.811 
agriculturejt  57070 1.5885 2.7058 
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constructionjt 57070 0.0233 0.0609 
Gas_pricejt  58240 0.6922 0.3869 
carsjt  57330 217.8 181.5 
coast_lengthj 60060 19.039 40.391 
cloud_coverj 59150 58.64 14.19 
latitudej 60060 35.32 16.65 
GDP_percapitajt 59605 12953.1 9107.0 
winter_tempj 59150 7.355 11.20 
 
The patent breadth variable φj  
We computed patent breadth coefficients in a previous study (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2009). That 
strategy consists in analyzing so-called international patent families that include patents protecting a 
given technology in several countries. By doing so, we found, for instance, that on average, one patent 
filed at the European Patent Office (EPO) translates up to 1.4 patent when the same technology is 
patented at the Japanese patent office. Setting the weight of applications at the EPO to unity, we 
calculated patent breadth coefficients Φj for every patent office included in the PATSTAT database. 
These coefficients are available in Dechezleprêtre et al. (2009). We use φj =log Φj in this study. 
5.3 Other econometric issues 
 
A notable feature of our data is that most patents are only filed in one country (usually, the 
inventor’s country), implying that the patent flow between two countries in a given year frequently 
equals zero. As shown in Table 4, the proportion of zeros in the data sets ranges from 68% to 81%, 
depending on the technology. Therefore, the use of OLS may generate inefficient estimates. The 
Poisson distribution would be too restrictive, as it imposes a mean that is equal to the variance. In our 
case, the data are highly over dispersed with a sample variance that is on average 10 times greater than 
the mean. For this reason, we use a negative binomial regression model, which tests and corrects for 
over-dispersion. Following Branstetter (2001), we run the regressions with the number of patents Pijt 
as the dependent variable. 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics for the dependent variable, by technology 
Technology Obs Mean Std. Dev. Frequency of 0 
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Biomass 23205 0.152 1.018 72.0% 
Buildings 30615 0.167 1.014 73.4% 
Cement 17875 0.064 0.352 79.9% 
Fuel injection 33020 0.682 8.243 81.9% 
Geothermal 17225 0.048 0.736 67.4% 
Hydro 20930 0.044 0.299 76.0% 
Lighting 31525 0.725 10.279 68.5% 
Methane 25415 0.082 0.501 78.3% 
Ocean 28080 0.039 0.273 68.9% 
Solar 39975 0.162 1.638 71.5% 
Waste 27365 0.316 3.289 69.8% 
Wind 37440 0.118 1.197 79.0% 
 
 
A further difficulty is that the propensity to patent is just partly controlled by the variable iprjt, which 
only reflects cross-border heterogeneity. Yet we know that patenting propensity also varies much 
across sectors and technologies. We mitigate this problem by running sector-specific regressions.  The 
remaining unobserved part is captured by the random term γjt in (5). If γjt is uncorrelated with the 
regressors on the right-hand side, then this effect can be estimated using a random-effects model. But 
if the random term is correlated, then estimates are biased. A fixed effect estimator cannot totally fix 
this problem, since this effect varies over time.  
For our estimations, we opted for a random-effects model for the following reasons. First, key 
variables such as iprjt or trade_blocijt do not vary much across time. They are thus highly correlated 
with country-pair specific effects, which leads to inefficient estimates of their coefficients when using 
a fixed effect model. Second, fixed effect estimation causes all groups with zero patent transferred 
during the 1990–2003 period to be dropped from the regression, including many potential technology 
suppliers, which induces a selection bias. For that same reason, we cannot perform the standard 
Hausman test of the random versus fixed effects specification as the models are ran on different 
samples. 
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6 Results 
We report the results in Tables 3a and 3b. Estimates across technologies are relatively stable, 
although there are some differences, which we will discuss below. We focus the interpretation on six 
policy-relevant questions. 
1) Does accumulated knowledge facilitate the import of technology? The local stock of 
technology-specific knowledge Sjt-1 has a significant positive impact on the flows of patents in 11 
regressions out of 12. The coefficient is statistically significant at the 0.1% level. There is no doubt 
that patent transfers increase if the recipient country is actively involved in R&D in the same 
technology field. 
In contrast, the recipient country’s level of education is statistically significant only in six 
regressions and has a positive impact only in three of them. This makes it impossible to derive a 
precise conclusion on the effect of this variable: generic absorptive capabilities are less important than 
technology-specific knowledge. 
2) Do strict intellectual property rights promote technology transfer? As mentioned earlier, 
this issue is very high in the political agenda. Our results indicate a significant influence of strict IP 
rights on technology transfer in 7 regressions out of 12, with a positive sign for 5 technologies (wind 
energy, solar energy, hydro, cement, building, methane). The two exceptions – lighting and ocean 
energy – suggest that in some cases stricter IP rights may also raise legal barriers to technology 
competition.  
When IPR strictness has a significant positive effect, part of the induced patenting could also 
reflect a substitution between patented and non-patented knowledge flows, rather than additional 
technology flows. 
3) Do restrictions on international trade hinder technology transfer? Restrictions to trade 
seem to be more important than IPR strictness: Higher tariff rates have a statistically significant 
negative impact on patent flows in 9 regressions. This result is confirmed by the fact that being part of 
the same trade bloc significantly increases patent flows in eight regressions (with a significant 
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negative effect only for geothermal energy). This suggests that transferred technologies are frequently 
incorporated in equipment goods. 
4) Do restrictions on foreign direct investments hinder technology transfer? Stricter 
international capital control has a statistically significant positive effect in five regressions. This is 
clearly counter-intuitive. Several factors may explain this result, involving either a real effect on 
technology transfers or simply an increased use of patents as a means to secure these transfers. We do 
not know the precise contents of FDI regulations in the different countries, since we use a synthetic 
index developed by the World Economic Forum, but in some cases FDI control may directly aim at 
promoting the transfer of technology through foreign investments. More generally, it is likely that 
regulations increase the risk of losing control of transferred technology,xiv thus pushing foreign 
investors to rely more heavily on patents as a way to secure their intellectual assets. A final 
interpretation could be that restrictions on FDI tend to shift technology transfer to other channels—
such as licensing to local users—that are more patent-intensive than FDI. 
Other variables 
Demand variables are either not significant or exhibit the expected signs. For instance, the cloud 
coverage in the recipient country reduces the number of solar technologies that are imported. The 
transfer of fuel-injection technologies increases with gasoline prices and with number of cars. The 
production of renewable electricity promotes the import of renewable energy technologies (see 
elec_renew, elec_biomass, elec_hydro), etc. 
As expected, technology flows fall as geographic distance increases and rise if both countries 
speak the same language. The recipient country’s size (pop) and economic wealth (GDP_percapita) 
also promote the importation of technologies. 
Finally, the control variable Σdistance has the expected positive impact in many regressions: the 
longer the geographical distance between the recipient country j and the technology providers from 
countries k≠ i, j, the larger the transfer from country i. Similarly, the higher the number of countries k≠ 
i, j speaking the same language as the recipient country (captured by Σlanguage), or participating in 
trade agreements with this country(captured by Σtrade_bloc), the less the transfer from country i.  
 22 
6 Conclusions 
In this paper we use the PATSTAT database to analyze the international diffusion of patented 
inventions in twelve climate-related technologies between 1990 and 2003. This allows us to draw 
conclusions about those factors which promote or hinder international technology transfer.  
Regressions show that absorptive capacities of recipient countries are determinant factors. This is 
particularly true for technology-specific knowledge, whereas the general level of education exerts less 
influence. 
We also assess the impacts of different policy barriers. The results stress that restrictions to the 
international trade of equipment goods—e.g., high tariff rates—negatively influence the international 
diffusion of patented knowledge. Lax intellectual property regimes have the same negative effect for 
most technologies, although our results suggest that they might also raise legal barriers in two cases. 
In addition, results suggest that, unexpectedly, barriers to Foreign Direct Investments promote 
technology transfer in those cases where the coefficients are significant. This puzzle can have different 
interpretations. Perhaps strict FDI regulations include requirements of technology transfers. Another 
interpretation is that restrictions on FDI lead foreign technology owners to rely more systematically on 
patents, either to secure their FDI or as an alternative to it. 
In conclusion, it is crucial to recall that patents are imperfect proxies of technology transfer 
for reasons explained in the paper. This should be kept in mind when interpreting the results. If the 
transfer of patented technologies is positively correlated with non-patented knowledge flows (e.g., 
know-how), our work gives a general view of the international diffusion of knowledge. Alternatively, 
if they are negatively correlated, because they are substitutes, our results only give a partial view of 
the overall picture. Further work is clearly necessary to clarify these points. 
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Table 3a. Results for wind, ocean, solar, hydro, biomass, and geothermal. 
Variable Wind Ocean Solar Hydro biomass Geothermal 
0.6552*** 0.8625*** 0.4425*** 0.3421*** 0.3101*** 0.134 Sjt-1 (0.0525) (0.0832) (0.0442) (0.0774) (0.1059) (0.0103) 
-.0159*** -0.0038 -0.0098*** -0.0016 0.0142** 0.0228*** edujt (0.0038) (0.0048) (0.0029) (0.0047) (0.0058) (0.0069) 
0.2686*** -0.2451* 0.1365* 0.4483*** 0.1507 -0.1953 iprjt (0.0962) (0.1297) (0.0756) (0.125) (0.1861) (0.1912) 
-.0375*** -0.0197 -0.0294*** -0.0173 -0.0271 -0.0644*** tariffjt  (0.0096) (0.0122) (0.0065) (0.0112) (0.017) (0.0192) 
0.6331** 1.496*** 0.1658 0.4932*** 1.069*** -0.4997* trade_blocjt (0.173) (0.2167) (0.1099) (0.1838) (0.2751) (0.2927) 
0.0876*** -0.0342 0.0208 0.0636* 0.0018 -0.0471 fdi_controljt  (0.0309) (0.0404) (0.0219) (0.0379) (0.0534) (0.0579) 
0.5124*** 0.7139*** 0.7174*** 0.6506*** 0.9696*** 1.347*** languageijt (0.1827) (0.1829) (0.1852) (0.2525) (0.2382) (0.2969) 
-0.2718*** -0.1033 -0.3668*** -0.2396** -0.1701 -0.1474 distanceijt (0.0813) (0.0952) (0.0654) (0.096) (0.1104) (0.1243) 
0.02*** 0.0288*** 0.0127*** 0.0205*** 0.0082* 0.0131**  
(0.0031) (0.004) (0.0032) (0.0042) (0.0046) (0.0054) 
0.0051 0.0262 -0.0285*** -0.0018 -0.0405** 0.0171  
(0.0127) (0.017) (0.0089) (0.0159) (0.0206) (0.0218) 
0.0127 -0.0011 -0.0083 -0.0334* -0.0279 -0.0733***  
(0.0133) (0.0148) (0.013) (0.0182) (0.0202) (0.0234) 
-0.6487 0.3389 0.9633 0.3556 -0.8956 -1.83* patent_breadth 
(0.5783) (0.8309) (0.61) (0.8501) (0.8112) (0.9929) 
3.0e-05*** 1.4e-05 8.0e-05*** 6.9e-05*** 5.1e-05*** 4.8e-05** GDP_percapitajt (9.7e-06) (1.2e-05) (8.8e-06) (1.5e-05) (1.7e-05) (1.9e-05) 
-0.0801 -0.1676** 0.3791*** 0.3717*** 0.2707*** 0.2607*** popjt (6.44e-02) (7.95e-02) (6.48e-02) (8.88e-02) (1.04e-01) (9.66e-02) 
0.0045*** 0.0055*** 2.7e-04   0.0078** elec_renewit 
(0,0015) (0.0017) (0.0016)   (0.003) 
0.003** 0.0044***     coast_lengthj (0.0013) (0.0013)     
  -0.0237***    cloud_coverj   (0.0051)    
  0.0079    latitudej   (6. 8e-03)    
   0.0245**   elec_hydrojt    (0.0099)   
    0.0057**  elec_biomassjt 
    (0.0026)  
-11.63*** -15.48*** -9.005*** -16.93*** -9.173*** -9.21*** constant 
1.679 2.239 1.91 2.313 2.822 3.038 
Log-likelihood -5676 -2884 -7295 -2518 -1309 -1112 
Observations  26350 19168 28120 18571 11499 9035 
Notes: Standard error in parentheses; * denotes significance at 5% level, ** denotes significance at 
1% level. Time dummies included in each regression (not reported for brevity) 
 
Table 3b. Results for waste, cement, lighting, building, methane, and fuel injection 
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Variable Waste Cement light Building Methane Fuel injection 
0.3493*** 0.2673*** 0.1638*** 0.4635*** 0.3239*** 0.2859*** Sjt-1 (5.19e-02) (0.0677) (0.0367) (0.048) (0.0607) (0.0378) 
0.0073** 0.0052 0.0055* -0.009** 0.002 0.0011 edujt (0.0031) (0.0044) (0.0031) (0.0037) (0.0035) (0.0031) 
0.0636 0.3658*** -0.1642* 0.2109*** 0.3011*** 0.025 iprjt (0.0779) (0.1053) (0.0845) (0.0766) (0.0931) (0.0775) 
-0.0412*** -0.04*** -0.0413*** -0.0369*** -0.0475*** -0.0218*** tariffjt  (0.007) (0.0103) (0.0075) (0.0076) (0.0086) (0.007) 
0.2855*** 0.0633 0.9004*** 0.0832 0.5596*** 0.424*** trade_blocjt (0.0997) (0.1549) (0.1462) (0.0872) (0.131) (0.1064) 
0.0177 0.0896*** 0.0394 0.0761*** 0.052* -0.0097 fdi_controljt  (0.0226) (0.0317) (0.0264) (0.0219) (0.0267) (0.0226) 
0.5505*** 0.7218*** 0.8635*** 0.7308*** 0.5288*** 0.6797*** languageijt (0.1866) (0.2376) (0.1535) (0.2089) (0.1993) (0.166) 
-0.3682*** -0.4918*** 0.172*** -0.4022*** -0.5591*** -0.1297** distanceijt (0.0674) (0.0883) (0.0542) (0.0702) (0.0792) (0.0585) 
0.0097*** 0.0136*** -0.0096*** 0.0097*** 0.016*** 0.0054**  
(0.0028) (0.0039) (0.0025) (0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0025) 
-0.0353*** -0.0452*** -0.023** -0.0162* -0.0504*** 0.0214**  
(0.0086) (0.0129) (0.0101) (0.0087) (0.0116) (0.009) 
-0.0287** -0.0427*** -0.005 -0.0263* -0.0313** -0.0277**  
(0.0126) (0.0163) (0.0106) (0.0138) (0.0145) (0.0111) 
-1.122** -0.8653 -1.539*** -1.041* -0.6361 0.3544 patent_breadth 
(0.5268) (0.6736) (0.4698) (0.5663) (0.6018) (0.4883) 
6.0e-05*** 5.0e-05*** 5.1e-05*** 4.4e-05*** 4.4e-05*** 3.9e-05*** GDP_percapitajt (9.70e-06) (1.40-05) (1.00-05) (9.70e-06) (1.20-05) (1.00-05) 
0.299*** 0.3141*** 0.24*** 0.265*** 0.328*** 0.4858*** popjt (6.40e-02) (8 .73e-02) (6.98e-02) (6.99e-02) (7.76e-02) (5.41e-02) 
0.0047***      elec_renewit (0.0016)      
 -0.0583 -0.0831 0.3632   constructionjt  (0.5766) (0.2788) (0.3073)   
 8.0e-04 0.0031*** 8.1e-04   urbanjt  (0.0013) (7.70-04) (0.0011)   
   -0.011   winter_tempj    (0.0077)   
    0.0208  agriculturejt      (0.0234)  
     0.2313** gas_pricejt      (0.0935) 
     0.0013*** carsjt      (4.50-04) 
-7.591*** -9.201*** -0.1191 -7.546*** -9.892*** -9.448*** constant 
1.537 2.05 1.458 1.851 1.818 1.36 
Log-likelihood -6254 -3019 -8161 -7077 -4322 -7605 
Observations 22373 15303 23732 24492 18735 21939 
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Annex 1. Definition of IPC codes 
 
Description Class 
Buildings 
Insulation or other protection; Elements or use of specified material for 
that purpose. 
E04B 1/62 
Heat, sound or noise insulation, absorption, or reflection; Other building 
methods affording favorable thermal or acoustical conditions, e.g. 
accumulating of heat within walls 
E04B 1/74–78  
Insulating elements for both heat and sound E04B 1/88 
Units comprising two or more parallel glass or like panes in spaced 
relationship, the panes being permanently secured together 
E06B 3/66–67  
Wing frames not characterized by the manner of movement, specially 
adapted for double glazing 
E06B3/24 
Use of energy recovery systems in air conditioning, ventilation or screening. F24F 12/00 
Biomass 
Solid fuels based on materials of non-mineral origin—animal or plant C10L 5/42-44 
Engines operating on gaseous fuels from solid fuel—e.g. wood F02B 43/08 
Liquid carbonaceous fuels - organic compounds C10L 1/14 
Anion exchange - use of materials, cellulose or wood B01J 41/16 
Cement 
Natural pozzuolana cements C04B 7/12–13  
Cements containing slag C04B 7/14–21  
Iron ore cements C04B 7/22 
Cements from oil shales, residues or waste other than slag C04B 7/24-30 
Calcium sulfate cements C04B 11/00 
Fuel injection 
Arrangements of fuel-injection apparatus with respect to engines; Pump 
drives adapted top such arrangements F02M 39/00 
Fuel-injection apparatus with two or more injectors fed from a common 
pressure-source sequentially by means of a distributor F02M 41/00 
Fuel-injection apparatus operating simultaneously on two or more fuels or on 
a liquid fuel and another liquid, e.g. the other liquid being an anti-knock 
additive 
F02M 43/00 
Fuel-injection apparatus characterized by a cyclic delivery of specific 
time/pressure or time/quantity relationship F02M 45/00 
Fuel-injection apparatus operated cyclically with fuel-injection valves 
actuated by fluid pressure F02M 47/00 
Fuel-injection apparatus in which injection pumps are driven, or injectors are 
actuated, by the pressure in engine working cylinders, or by impact of engine 
working piston 
F02M 49/00 
Fuel injection apparatus characterized by being operated electrically. F02M 51/00 
Fuel-injection apparatus characterized by heating, cooling, or thermally-
insulating means F02M 53/00 
Fuel-injection apparatus characterized by their fuel conduits or their venting 
means F02M 55/00 
Fuel injectors combined or associated with other devices F02M 57/00 
Pumps specially adapted for fuel-injection and not provided for in groups 
F02M 39/00 to F02M 57/00 F02M 59/00 
Fuel injection not provided for in groups F02M 39/00 to F02M 57/00 F02M 61/00 
Other fuel-injection apparatus, parts, or accessories having pertinent 
characteristics not provided for F02M 63/00 
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Testing fuel-injection apparatus, e.g. testing injection timing F02M 65/00 
Low-pressure fuel-injection apparatus F02M 69/00 
Combinations of carburetors and low-pressure fuel-injection apparatus F02M 71/00 
Geothermal 
Other production or use of heat, not derived from combustion—using natural 
or geothermal heat F24J 3/00-08 
Devices for producing mechanical power from geothermal energy F03G 4/00-06 
Hydro power 
Machines or engines of reaction type (i.e. hydraulic turbines) F03B 3/00  
Water wheels F03B 7/00 
Adaptations of machines or engines for liquids for special use; Power 
stations or aggregates; Stations or aggregates of water-storage type; Machine 
or engine aggregates in dams or the like; Submerged units incorporating 
electric generators 
F03B 13/06-10 
Controlling machines or engines for liquids F03B15/00 
Lighting 
Gas- or vapor-discharge lamps (Compact Fluorescent Lamp) H01J 61/00 
Electroluminescent light sources (LED) H05B 33/00 
Methane capture 
Anaerobic treatment of sludge; Production of methane by such processes    C02F 11/04 
Biological treatment of water, waste water, or sewage: Anaerobic digestion 
processes 
C02F 3/28 
Apparatus with means for collecting fermentation gases, e.g. methane C12M  1/107 
Ocean power 
Tide or wave power plants E02B 9/08 
Adaptations of machines or engines for special use—characterized by using 
wave or tide energy F03B 13/12-26 
Mechanical-power-producing mechanisms—using pressure differences or 
thermal differences occurring in nature; ocean thermal energy conversion F03G 7/04-05 
Water wheels F03B 7/00 
Solar power 
Semiconductor devices sensitive to infra-red radiation, light, electromagnetic 
radiation of shorter wavelength, or corpuscular radiation and specially 
adapted either for the conversion of the energy of such radiation into 
electrical energy or for the control of electrical energy by such radiation—
adapted as conversion devices, including a panel or array of photoelectric 
cells, e.g. solar cells   
H01L 31/042-058 
Generators in which light radiation is directly converted into electrical energy H02N 6/00 
Aspects of roofing for energy collecting devices—e.g. including solar panels E04D 13/18 
Use of solar heat, e.g. solar heat collectors; Receivers working at high 
temperature, e.g. solar power plants; having lenses or reflectors as 
concentrating elements  
F24J 2/06-18 
Devices for producing mechanical power from solar energy F03G 6/00-06 
Use of solar heat; Solar heat collectors with support for article heated, e.g. 
stoves, ranges, crucibles, furnaces or ovens using solar heat   F24J 2/02 
Use of solar heat; solar heat collectors F24J 2/20-54 
Drying solid materials or objects by processes involving the application of 
heat by radiation—e.g. from the sun F26B 3/28 
Waste 
Solid fuels based on materials of non-material origin—refuse or waste C10L 5/46-48 
Machine plant or systems using particular sources of energy—waste F25B 27/02 
Hot gas or combustion—Profiting from waste heat of exhaust gases F02G 5/00-04 
Incineration of waste—recuperation of heat F23G 5/46 
 30 
Plants or engines characterized by use of industrial or other waste gases F01K 25/14 
Prod. of combustible gases—combined with waste heat boilers C10J 3/86 
Incinerators or other apparatus consuming waste—field organic waste F23G 7/10 
Manufacture of fuel cells—combined with treatment of residues H01M 8/06 
Wind power 
Wind motors with rotation axis substantially in wind direction F03D 1/00-06 
Wind motors with rotation axis substantially at right angle to wind direction  F03D 3/00-06 
Other wind motors  F03D 5/00-06 
Controlling wind motors F03D 7/00-06 
Adaptations of wind motors for special use F03D 9/00-02 
Details, component parts, or accessories not provided for in, or of interest 
apart from, the other groups of this subclass  F03D 11/00-04 
 
 
 
Notes  
 
                                                
i In contrast, the general empirical literature on international technology diffusion is well developed (for a good 
survey, see Keller, 2004). 
ii Alternatively Branstetter, Fisman and Foley (2006) or Smith (2001) use royalty payments and licenses. Such 
data provide an accurate view of the commercial value of technology transfers through a particular channel, 
namely IP licensing, but those data are available only for the U.S.A. Therefore it is not appropriate to assess 
global technology transfers through various channels. 
iii It is argued that the count of forward citations reflects the value of individual patents. This has been exploited 
in the literature to compute weighting coefficients. We could have done the same to control for the heterogeneity 
of patents’ value. However, citations data are not available for most countries (with the exceptions of the U.S.A. 
and the European Union). 
iv In fact, about 75% of the inventions are patented in only one country. 
v Note that Least Developed Countries are not present in our dataset, for two related reasons: Their patenting 
activity is extremely limited, and available statistics are not reliable. 
vi Previous studies have related patent classes to industrial sectors using concordances (e.g., Jaffe and Palmer, 
1997). The weaknesses of such an approach are twofold. First, if the industry of origin of a patent differs from 
the industry of use, then it is not clear to which industrial sector a patent should be attributed in the analysis. 
This is important when studying specifically “environmental” technology because in this case the demand (users 
of technology) and supply (inventors of technology) of environmental innovation may involve different entities. 
Often, “environmental” innovations originate in industries which are not specifically environmental in their 
focus. On the other hand, some “environmental” industries invent technologies which are widely applicable in 
non-environmental sectors (e.g., processes for separation of waste; separation of vapors and gases). More 
fundamentally, the use of sectoral classifications (and commodity classifications) will result in a bias toward the 
inclusion of patent applications from sectors that produce environmental goods and services. By contrast, the 
application-based nature of the patent classification systems allows for a richer characterization of relevant 
technologies. (See OECD 2008 for a full discussion of the relative merits of the approach adopted for this 
report.) 
vii The International Patent Classification can be searched for keywords at http://www.wipo.int/tacsy/. 
viii Available at http://ep.espacenet.com/. 
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ix A problem is that we do not have patent data from before 1978. In order to take inventions patented prior to 
this year into account, we set the initial value of knowledge stock at Sj1978 = Pini/(δ + g) where g is the average 
worldwide growth rate of patenting activity in the technology for the period 1978–1983 and  Pini is the average 
annual number of patents filed between 1978 and 1980. Note that the influence of the calculated initial stocks is 
greatly diminished as we perform regressions on the 1990–2003 period. 
x Distances between countries were taken from the online CEPII data sets available at 
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm. 
xi Obviously, distancejjt = 0. 
xii The average tariff rate and the index of international capital market controls are from the Economic Freedom 
of the World 2008 Annual Report. Missing years were filled by interpolation. 
xiii Data on population were obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2008. 
xiv China, for instance, is notorious for usually requiring foreign companies to create joint ventures with local 
partners, so that control of transferred technologies has to be shared. 
